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Abstract—It becomes urgent to design effective anti-spoofing
algorithms for vulnerable automatic speaker verification systems
due to the advancement of high-quality playback devices. Current
studies mainly treat anti-spoofing as a binary classification
problem between bonafide and spoofed utterances, while lack
of indistinguishable samples makes it difficult to train a ro-
bust spoofing detector. In this paper, we argue that for anti-
spoofing, it needs more attention for indistinguishable samples
over easily-classified ones in the modeling process, to make
correct discrimination a top priority. Therefore, to mitigate the
data discrepancy between training and inference, we propose to
leverage a balanced focal loss function as the training objective
to dynamically scale the loss based on the traits of the sample
itself. Besides, in the experiments, we select three kinds of features
that contain both magnitude-based and phase-based information
to form complementary and informative features. Experimental
results on the ASVspoof2019 dataset demonstrate the superiority
of the proposed methods by comparison between our systems and
top-performing ones. Systems trained with the balanced focal
loss perform significantly better than conventional cross-entropy
loss. With complementary features, our fusion system with only
three kinds of features outperforms other systems containing
five or more complex single models by 22.5% for min-tDCF
and 7% for EER, achieving a min-tDCF and an EER of 0.0124
and 0.55% respectively. Furthermore, we present and discuss the
evaluation results on real replay data apart from the simulated
ASVspoof2019 data, indicating that research for anti-spoofing
still has a long way to go.
Index Terms—Anti-spoofing, Replay attack detection, Data
discrepancy, Balanced focal loss, Modified GD-gram
I. INTRODUCTION
Automatic Speaker Verification (ASV), intended for au-
thenticating a claimed speaker identity by characteristics of
the voice, has shown promising results recently. With rapid
advancement of ASV and its wide applications such as smart
assistants and banking systems, vulnerability of ASV systems
has been gradually exposed. More specifically, current ASV
systems have almost no defense against spoofing attacks
(also known as presentation attacks). According to possible
attack locations in a typical ASV system (ISO/IEC 301071),
spoofing attacks can be categorized into four major classes:
(i) impersonation, (ii) speech synthesis, (iii) voice conversion
and (iv) replay. The first three classes rely on professional
knowledge heavily, while replay attack does not require any
B Corresponding author.
1https://www.iso.org/standard/67381.html
Fig. 1: An example for comparison between a bonafide utter-
ance and its corresponding spoofed utterances with different
attack types, illustrates that high-quality attack AA has only
subtle differences from the bonafide one, yet taking up a
small portion of the data. We term this phenomenon as
data discrepancy in anti-spoofing, and propose a method to
replace the conventional balanced cross-entropy loss (BCE)
with the novel balanced focal loss (BFL) as the training
objective. It is worth noting that hard and easy samples do
not have strict boundaries, nor will there be a certain attack
method as the dividing line, which demonstrates the necessity
of making dynamic adjustments with BFL. The MGD-gram
feature is used for visualization, see Fig.4 for high-resolution
visualization. Description of different attack types (AA, AB,
AC) and analysis are elaborated in Section V-B and Fig. 4,
respectively. Best viewed in color.
kind of expertise. Besides, easy access to high-quality play-
back devices makes it even more urgent to develop robust
anti-spoofing systems against replay attack, which is also the
goal we strive for in this work.
Thanks to the impetus injected by the 2015, 2017 and 2019
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ASVspoof Challenges, great achievements have been made by
numerous researchers in the past few years. In 2017, replay
attack detection was first introduced to the challenge with
the aim of measuring limits and developing countermeasures.
Simultaneously, deep learning-based approaches came to the
fore [1]. The ASVspoof2019 Challenge extended the previous
challenge with improved, controlled simulation and start-of-
the-art spoofing methods for generating replay data, as well as
new primary evaluation metric t-DCF [2]. Such anti-spoofing
systems as [3] and [4] ranked among the best systems, leading
to two lines of work for deep learning-based architectures. One
is based on LightCNN, and the other is based on ResNet [5].
Current state-of-the-art anti-spoofing systems mainly suffer
from two challenges. On the one hand, there exists discrepancy
in data distribution among training, testing, evaluation and real
data, which has a great impact on the model performance. Sim-
ilar to image classification, previous studies like [6, 7] regard
the data discrepancy as a class-imbalance problem. Widely-
adopted strategies to solve the class-imbalance problem can
be divided into re-sampling and re-weighting [8]. Re-sampling
strategies, including over-sampling and under-sampling, are
complicated and have drawbacks such as incurring risks from
removing important samples. Compared with re-sampling, re-
weighting strategies are relatively simple and based on the
statistics of data, for example, use the inverse of class fre-
quency as the weighting factor [6]. For replay attack detection,
we argue that, the main challenge lies in the data discrepancy
and it cannot only be viewed as class-imbalance problems
of binary classification[6] or multi-class classification [4] in
a narrow sense. Strategies for the imbalance of different
classes place more emphasis on the inter-class fairness, while
for data discrepancy, more emphases are needed for easily-
misclassified indistinguishable samples, which only take up
a small portion in the training data, but are the overriding
factors as the attack sources come from increasingly accessible
quality devices[8, 9]. Therefore, a dynamically re-weighting
training objective becomes a crucial driving force to bridge
the gap. On the other hand, the need to select informative
feature representations arises when building a system with
a growing number of features. As a consequence, choosing
fewer but sufficient, complementary features is of supreme
importance [10]. In this paper, we focus on resolving the two
challenges mentioned above, especially the first one. Our main
contributions can be summarized as follows:
1) Inspired by [9], we leverage balanced focal loss as a
novel training objective for anti-spoofing, which enables
the model to attend more to indistinguishable samples
with dynamically scaled loss value. Through detailed
analysis, we find that balanced focal loss outperforms
balanced cross-entropy loss to a large extent. To our
knowledge, we are the first to introduce focal loss to
anti-spoofing, mitigating the data discrepancy between
training and inference.
2) Based on our survey of the ASVspoof2019 Challenge,
only group delay (GD) was used by researchers as
phased-based features. We extend the ideas from [11] to
first investigate the performance of the modified group
delay function [12], dubbed MGD-gram, on the im-
proved ASVspoof2019 dataset which uses start-of-the-
art spoofing methods for generating replay data. Also,
we demonstrate the superiority of fusion of three kinds
of complementary features, namely modified group de-
lay (MGD) gram, short-time Fourier transform (STFT)
gram and constant Q transform (CQT) gram.
3) We show that the performance of current top-performing
systems on real data are not as good as on the simulated
ASVspoof2019 data [13], which is unexpected and con-
sidered very worthy of discussion. This may be due to
the fact that simulated data cannot be applied to real
cases, or the distinctions between GMM and ConvNets.
Deep learning-based methods for anti-spoofing still have
a long way to go, as the conventional GMM model has
the best performance, although it is not good enough,
with an EER of 12.4%.
II. COST-SENSITIVE TRAINING — THE BALANCED FOCAL
LOSS
Almost all the anti-spoofing systems have poor performance
for samples made by replay devices with higher quality and
a shorter attacker-to-talker distance. These indistinguishable
samples can be easily misclassified, thus posing a severe threat
to anti-spoofing systems. Moreover, indistinguishable samples
only take up a small portion of the training data, making the
recognition extremely harder because the training procedure
is dominated by the majority. Specifically, for gradient-based
methods like neural networks, the gradients are dominated by
easy samples.
We term the above phenomenon as the data discrepancy
between training and inference in anti-spoofing. Unlike im-
age classification or object detection suffering from class-
imbalance, data discrepancy faced in anti-spoofing is a more
severe challenge, which emphasizes more on the correctness
of discrimination and the security of the biometric system than
just on the fairness between different classes of attacks.
To mitigate this problem, on the basis of the common
strategy to solve class imbalance, i.e. simple re-weighting
(balancing by class frequency), we further propose to leverage
BFL as the training objective instead of BCE. Focal loss was
first used in the field of object detection, and its validity has
been tested on many tasks [9].
We use the example shown in Fig. 1 to illustrate our idea.
As shown in Fig. 1, only subtle differences exist with red
marks for the sample of attack type AA, compared with other
two samples of “easier” attack types such as AB and AC.
Intuitively, to increase the accuracy for harder samples of
attack type AA, we need to make the system pay more atten-
tion to them during training. Therefore, simply by assigning
bigger loss values to harder samples and smaller values to
easier examples, we can achieve our goal.
Formally, the balanced focal loss, a weighted variant of the
standard focal loss, can be calculated as:
BFL (pt) = −αt (1− pt)γ log (pt) , (1)
where subscript t refers to the true class label, and α denotes
the weight for the corresponding class to mitigate the class-
imbalance problem, and γ is tunable as a focusing parameter
to control the relative scaling. We find γ = 2 best in the
experiments (the red curve in the Fig. 1).
Both BFL and BCE use αt (the inverse of class frequency)
to statically re-weight the loss. The main difference between
BFL and BCE is that BFL uses an additional weighting factor
(1− pt)γ to dynamically scale the value of the contribution
of each sample to the final loss, based on the probability
of target label pt and a focusing factor γ, so as to focus
more on indistinguishable samples and reduce the relative
loss for easily-classified samples, as illustrated in Fig. 1. It
is worth noting that since pt is the probability of the target
label predicted by the weight, using (1− pt)γ to scale the loss
is like performing a soft attention.
III. THE MODEL ARCHITECTURE — END-TO-END
RESIDUAL NETWORK
TABLE I: The network structure used in this paper. The input
feature size is (1, 513, 500). Any two convolutional layers have
batch normalization followed by the ReLU activation function
in between. Global average pooling is used between the last
convolutional layer and the fully-connected layer.
Layer Filter Output shape # Params.
Conv2d 3x3,1 (16, 513, 500) 144
Max Pooling – (16, 513, 500) –
ResBlock1 x 3 3x3,16 (16, 513, 500) 4.6k x 3
ResBlock2 x 4 3x3, 32 (32, 257, 250) 18.4k x 4
ResBlock3 x 6 3x3, 64 (64, 129, 125) 73.7k x 6
ResBlock4 x 3 3x3, 128 (128, 65, 63) 295.0k x 3
GAP – (128, ) –
FC 32 (32, ) 4.1k
Output 2 (2, ) 66
Recently, with great progress made by researchers partic-
ipating in the 2015, 2017 and 2019 ASVspoof challenges,
LightCNN-based and ResNet-based deep neural networks have
become the mainstream as high-level feature extractors [1, 3,
4]. As mentioned earlier, instead of proposing a novel network
architecture, this work mainly aims to present informative
feature representations and the effective training objective.
Hence, we select the ResNet-based end-to-end model as the
backbone, making use of its superior extracting and modeling
capabilities.
As illustrated with detailed configurations in Table I, our
model is similar to [7]. The main differences are: (i) fixed-
length feature representations are used, and features are either
padded or truncated to n frames = 500 along the time axis
according to statistics derived from data, whereas in [7],
the model takes fixed-length input utterances for training
and variable-length utterances for test. The purpose of our
modification behind is to facilitate the training process while
maintaining consistency during training and inference; (ii) all
the models are trained from scratch with no modification of
data, that is, we use neither data augmentation nor pre-trained
techniques.
The final countermeasure score, representing the genuine-
ness judgement for each utterance provided by the system, is
calculated as the log-likelihood ratio using Eq. (2),
scm(utt) = log(p(bonafide|utt; θ))− log(p(spoof|utt; θ))
(2)
where utt refers to a test utterance, and θ denotes model
parameters. This is also a recommended method for score
computation by the ASVspoof2019 Commmittee. The prob-
abilities of bonafide and spoofed speech utterances are given
by the final softmax layer of the model.
IV. INTEGRATION OF COMPLEMENTARY FEATURES
Magnitude-based information included in short-time Fourier
transform gram has been widely used in top-performing anti-
spoofing systems such as [4] and [6], while features con-
taining phased-based information used in [11] and [7] also
yield superior performance. However, in the ASVSpoof2019
Challenge, we find that only GD-gram was used by researches
as phased-based time-frequency representation, although Mod-
ified GD feature has been proved effective in the previous
work [14, 15]. To further investigate their performance on
the improved ASVSpoof2019 dataset, we compare MGD-gram
with GD-gram in out experiments. Both of them are low-level
time-frequency representations, which can better utilize the
modeling capabilities of the ResNet neural network. Besides,
to integrate complementary features, in this paper, we care-
fully explore three different kinds of features, namely MGD-
gram, STFT-gram and CQT-gram. We employ the MGD-
gram and STFT-gram to integrate both magnitude and phase
information. Also, the CQT-gram, shown in [16] to yield
a superior performance to general forms of spoofing attack
with higher frequency resolution in the lower frequency(?),
is added to them to form complementary informative feature
representations.
A. Modified Group Delay Gram (MGD-gram)
In [7, 11], the group delay function, defined as the negative
derivative of phase, was used to characterize speech signals
to distinguish bonafide utterances from spoofed ones on the
ASVspoof2019 dataset.
As clearly illustrated in [17], the vanilla group delay func-
tion suffers from its spiky nature and requires the signal be
a minimum phase. However, speech segments can be non-
minimum due to zeroes from windowing and noise. The MGD
function is thus proposed as a parameterized and improved
version of the GD function, which is formulated using [12]:
τm(ω, t) =
(
τ(ω, t)′
|τ(ω, t)′|
)
(|τ(ω, t)′|)ρ, (3)
where
τ(ω, t)′ =
(
XR(ω, t)YR(ω, t) + YI(ω, t)XI(ω, t)
S(ω, t)2λ
)
, (4)
where S(ω, t) is the cepstrally smoothed version of |X(ω, t)|,
and ρ and λ are newly added parameters to reduce the
aforementioned spikes (0 < ρ ≤ 1.0 and 0 < λ ≤ 1.0).
After replacing the GD function with the MGD function, we
can easily get the MGD-gram representation by concatenating
all the frames’ outputs.
B. Short-time Fourier Transform Gram (STFT-gram)
The short-time Fourier transform (STFT) [18] was proposed
to solve the problem that the Fourier transform cannot reflect
local features of a signal. The utterances are first broken up
into overlapping frames and then the Fourier transform is
performed on each short frame, forming a 2-D complex matrix
finally. STFT converts a time domain signal into a frequency
domain signal. STFT-gram (also know as spectrogram) is
one of the most widely-used features now, which contains
magnitude-based information. In [4], many systems achieved
great performance with STFT-gram. As a result, we choose
STFT-gram as one of our complementary features.
C. Constant Q Transform Gram (CQT-gram)
The constant Q transform (CQT) [19] employs geometri-
cally spaced frequency bins to make the constant Q factor
across entire spectrum. CQT was designed to resolve problems
for musical temperament as it can give the same frequency
as the scale frequency. Simultaneously, CQT performs well
for automatic speaker verification with a higher frequency
resolution at lower frequencies and a higher temporal res-
olution at higher frequencies, which enables it closer to
human perception. Thus, we incorporate CQT-gram into our
complementary features. We apply CQT on the utterance, and
log transform is followed to derive the CQT-gram.
D. Fusion Scheme
In our experiments, we train three models that have identical
model architecture with aforementioned features, and later fuse
their scores by taking the average (mean-fusion) and employ-
ing logistics regression (LR). Note that we strictly follow the
evaluation protocol from the ASVspoof2019 Challenge [13].
V. EXPERIMENTS & ANALYSIS
Experiments in this study were conducted using PyTorch
[20], a deep learning library in Python. Source code and other
details are publicly available at https://github.com/asvspoof/
ASVspoof2019 system.
A. Baseline Systems
Offical Baselines: We adopt the officially two baseline
models together with the dataset released by the ASVspoof
2019 Committee. These two systems are based on the same
conventional 2-class GMM backend with 512 components and
two kinds of acoustic features, namely linear frequency cep-
stral coefficients (LFCC) and constant Q cepstral coefficients
(CQCC). Details can be found in [13].
Top-performing NN-based Models: According to the
challenge results reported in [5], many top systems employ
neural network(NN)-based models. To further test the perfor-
mance of our proposed methods, we choose the newly pub-
lished systems ranked 3rd sidual architectures to our NN-based
baseline models [4, 7]. The top-1 system of this challenge
has not been publicly available yet, and the top-2 system is a
LightCNN based one with some modifications on feature sizes
which is not very suitable for comparison. Specifically, we
adopt the ResNet architecture trained with the balanced cross-
entropy loss as our baseline models [7]. Note that in order to
control variables, we further re-implemented the work in [7]
under the same settings with a similar network architecture.
B. Settings
Datasets:
The ASVspoof2019 simulated PA dataset [13], an improved
version with controlled environments and acoustic configura-
tions of the dataset of 2017, can be divided into three subsets:
the training set (PA train set), the development set (PA dev
set), and the evaluation set (PA eval set).
In addition to the simulated PA subsets, we use the Real-
PA dataset, recently released by the ASVspoof committee
[13], which was made with real replay operations from three
different labs, to further test the performance of anti-spoofing
systems. Note that the real data contains additive noise,
which is not contained in the simulated PA subsets. As a
consequence, spoofing detection results on the real replay
data are not expected to be as good as those obtained from
the simulated PA subsets, but we can still get some insights
by comparing conventional methods with deep learning-based
methods.
Details about the simulated PA datasets and the Real-PA
dataset are illustrated in Table II and Table III.
TABLE II: Statistics of datasets used in this work
Datasets # Bonafide utterances # Spoofed utterances
PA train set 5,400 48,600
PA dev set 5,400 24,300
PA eval set 18,090 116,640
Real-PA set 540 2,160
TABLE III: Detailed information of different attack sources
Attack Factor
Factor Type
A B C
Attacker-to-talker distance Da (cm) 10− 50 50− 100 > 100
Replay device quality Q perfect high low
Feature Extraction: We use the following configurations
to extract features:
TABLE IV: Overall Performance of different systems on the ASVspoof2019 PA eval set. We experimented with mean-fusion
and logistic regression (LR) fusion for models that use three kinds of features all trained with BCE or BFL. The BFL + LR
Fusion achieves the best performance with only three single models. Better generalization ability of the proposed methods
could be seen, i.e. reduced overfitting on the PA Dev Set.
Method System # Models
PA Dev Set PA Eval Set
t-DCFminnorm EER(%) t-DCF
min
norm EER(%)
Official Baseline
LFCC+GMM -a 0.2554 11.96 0.3017 13.54
CQCC+GMM - 0.1953 9.87 0.2454 11.04
[7] Fusion System 6 0.0064 0.24 0.0168 0.66
[4] Fusion System 5 0.0030 0.13 0.0160 0.59
This work
BCE + Mean Fusion 3 0.0092 0.40 0.0153 0.62
BCE + LR Fusion 3 0.0084 0.37 0.0151 0.61
BFL + Mean Fusion 3 0.0075 0.35 0.0127 0.56
BFL + LR Fusion 3 0.0077 0.35 0.0124 0.55
a The official baseline adopts conventional methods and therefore does not participate in the comparison of the
number of neural networks used for model ensemble.
• STFT-gram: STFT spectrum was extracted with 25-ms
frame length and 10-ms frame shift. The number of FFT
bins was set to 1,024. Spectrums of all the frames were
then concatenated to form STFT-gram.
• MGD-gram: Tuned on the development set, the parame-
ters of the MGD function were empirically set to ρ = 0.2
and λ = 0.7. The number of FFT bins was 1,024.
• CQT-gram: CQT spectrum was extracted with a hop
length of 128 sample points. The number of octaves and
the number of bins per octave b were set to 9 and 96,
respectively.
Training Scheme: The networks were optimized by the
AdamW optimizer [21], with parameter settings β1 = 0.9,
β2 = 0.999, and weight decay 5e-5, which can substantially
improve the generalization performance of the widely-used op-
timizer Adam. Besides, scheduler ReduceLROnPlateau in Py-
Torch was employed with max patience = 3 and reduce factor
= 0.1 to reduce the learning rate once learning stagnated.
Evaluation Metrics:
• Tandem detection cost function (t-DCF) : Introduced in
the ASVspoof2019 Challenge, t-DCF reflects the influ-
ence of spoofing countermeasure (CM) performance on
ASV reliability under the same analysis framework [2].
We adopt the t-DCF as the primary evaluation metric.
• Equal Error Rate (EER): Determined by adjusting the
threshold to make the false rejection rate (FRR) equal to
false acceptance rate (FAR), EER is used as the secondary
evaluation metric in our experiments, which is suitable for
measuring the performance of a single anti-spoofing or
ASV system.
C. Evaluation Results on the ASVspoof2019 PA Eval Set
1) Overall Performance: Table IV gives our overall per-
formance on the PA eval set. We compare our models with
the top-performing systems [7] and [4] ranked 3rd and 4th
in the 2019 challenge. Instead of these baseline models with
five or more complex single models, our best fusion system
outperforms them with only three single models, which is
simple and computationally efficient. The results on the PA
dev set and PA eval set also demonstrate the effectiveness
of the balanced focal loss that focuses on harder samples to
mitigate the discrepancy of data distributions between training
and inference and make a model more generalizable.
TABLE V: Performance of MGD-gram vs GD-gram under
different configurations on the ASVspoof2019 PA dev set.
No other tricks like data augmentation were used in our
experiments.
Feature Model t-DCFminnorm EER(%)
GD-gram ResNet w BCE 0.0467 1.81
MGD-gram ResNet w BCE 0.0288 1.07
MGD-gram ResNet w BFL 0.0257 1.04
2) Results on MGD-gram vs GD-gram: The results in Table
V show that MGD-gram is significantly better than GD-gram
(by 40.9%) as a kind of feature representation. Comparison in
Table V also verifies the effectiveness of the balanced focal
loss. More detailed evaluation results for BFL will be reported
in later subsections.
3) Single Models: As shown in Table VI, on the PA eval set,
for single models, all the deep learning-based models achieve
better performance than the conventional GMM models. In
the ASVspoof2019 Challenge, [7] proposes to model speech
characteristics using the ResNet architecture [22] and phase-
based GD-gram features. [4], using STFT-gram as the feature
input, employs SENet which contains squeeze and excitation
operations to facilitate the feature extraction and explicitly
TABLE VI: Performance of different single models on the
ASVspoof2019 PA eval set. EM refers to the expectation
maximization algorithm for the GMM model training.
Method Model
Training
Objective
PA Dev Set PA Eval Set
t-DCFminnorm EER(%) t-DCF
min
norm EER(%)
[7] ResNet+GD-gram BCE 0.0467 1.81 0.0439 1.79
[4] SENet+STFT-gram BCE 0.0150 0.58 0.036 1.29
This work
ResNet+STFT-gram BCE 0.0131 0.65 0.0261 1.12
+STFT-gram BFL 0.0163 0.63 0.0251 1.01
ResNet+MGD-gram BCE 0.0288 1.07 0.0396 1.57
+MGD-gram BFL 0.0257 1.04 0.0343 1.39
ResNet+CQT-gram BCE 0.0445 1.87 0.0477 2.02
+CQT-gram BFL 0.0393 1.80 0.0465 1.89
model the importance of different feature channels. Compared
with them, our single models, with a similar architecture to
[7] and features introduced in Section IV, show competitive
results. It is worth mentioning that the number of parameters
in our models is less than that of [4].
Comparing our models trained with BFL and BCE, we find
that models equipped with BFL as the training objective signif-
icantly outperform those with BCE. Taking the ResNet+MGD-
gram as an example, BFL improves the min-tDCF and EER by
12.6% and 11.5%, respectively. The ResNet+STFT-gram+BFL
model achieves the overall best performance and shows a
better generalization ability in terms of the results on the PA
dev set and the PA eval set when compared with SENet+STFT-
gram in [4]. Detailed analysis for the effectiveness of the
training objective with respect to each attack type will be
reported in Subsection V-D.
D. Effectiveness of the Training Objective
In this subsection, we present detailed performance analysis
for the training objective with the results of the single models
and fusion systems over nine attacks.
To make detailed analysis for the effectiveness of the train-
ing objective, we divide the PA Eval Set into nine parts based
on the types of spoofing attack information, corresponding to
nine different spoofing methods: AA, AB, AC, BA, BB, BC,
CA, CB, and CC. We experiment with single attacks and then
plot the score statistics in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3.
Fig. 2: Detailed evaluation results over nine attack types for
single models and the best fusion system BFL + LR Fusion in
terms of min-tDCF and EER. All the single models are trained
with BFL. Best viewed in color.
As shown in Fig.2, the three complementary independent
models using BFL and the fusion system that combining these
three have a good ability to discriminate against every type of
spoof information, and for types that are more difficult and
closer to the bonafide ones such as AB, BA, and CA, those
trained with BFL still have strong ability to distinguish the
bonafide and spoofed utterances. In particular, for type AA,
which is almost indistinguishable from bonafide utterances, the
system using BFL also achieves lower min-tDCF and EER.
Fig. 3: Comparision of fusion systems BCE+LR Fusion and
BFL+LR Fusion based on the balanced focal loss and cross-
entropy loss in terms of min-tDCF and EER over nine attack
types. Best viewed in color.
Fig.3 shows the performance of two fusion systems with
two different loss functions over nine types of spoofing attack
methods. As can be seen from this figure, the use of BFL
makes BFL+LR Fusion perform much better than BCE+LR
Fusion. It is worth mentioning that for the quality attack
samples of type AA, which is difficult to distinguish, the
fusion system using BFL is more distinguishable than the
fusion system using the widely-used balanced cross-entropy
loss. This also reflects the robustness and generalization ability
of the BFL+LR Fusion system, dynamically focusing more on
indistinguishable samples.
E. Understanding the Network Decisions with Saliency Maps
via Backpropagation
To better understand how the network make its classification
decisions and verify our original motivation of leveraging BFL
as the proper training objective to solve the data discrepancy
problem, we further visualize the the original features and
their corresponding saliency maps via backpropagation [23],
an efficient way of network visualization. As shown in Fig. 4,
the magnitudes of saliency maps are decreasing from quality
attack type AA to relatively easy type AC. The decreasing
gradient magnitude, together with increasing amount of hot
“pixels” (time-frequency bins), verifies the initial intuition (see
Fig.1) and demonstrates the necessity of our proposed method.
F. Evaluation Results on the Real-PA Set
The performance of different systems on the ASVspoof2019
Real-PA set are shown in Table VII. To our knowledge, we
are the first to report the evaluation results on the recently-
released Real-PA dataset [13], and unexpected experimental
results are shown which are worthy of discussion. We can
observe that current top-performing systems on real data are
not as good as on the ASVspoof2019 simulated PA dataset.
Although there is additional noise in the Real-PA set which is
Fig. 4: Visualization of original features (Top) vs. saliency maps (Bottom) via backpropagation to better understand critical
parts for the network’s making classification decisions. Hotness corresponds to regions that have a big impact on the final
decisions. Decreasing gradient magnitude and increasing amount of hot pixels (time-frequency bins) verified the proposed idea,
since higher gradient magnitude of harder attack types, with fewer amount of hot pixels, implies more decision sensitivity to
value changes in corresponding pixels for utterances generated by quality attacks, hence these samples are harder.
TABLE VII: Performance of different systems on the
ASVspoof2019 Real-PA set. For fusion systems, only the
result of the best (Mean-Fusion) is reported in this table.
System
Training
Objective
EER(%)
LFCC+GMM EM 28.92
CQCC+GMM EM 12.40
ResNet+STFT-gram BCE 46.85
+STFT-gram BFL 51.50
ResNet+MGD-gram BCE 23.91
+MGD-gram BFL 29.86
ResNet+CQT-gram BCE 30.95
+CQT-gram BFL 23.56
Mean-Fusion BFL 25.02
not contained in the simulated PA dataset, conventional GMM
models still perform best. The performance degradation may
be due to the fact that simulated data cannot reflects real
scenarios completely. Another possible reason may be the
time-frequency distortions captured by CNN-based methods
like ResNet are not detected by the time-level GMM model,
which also needs further analysis and improvement.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper aimed at resolving two challenges when design-
ing replay attack detection systems. Firstly, we proposed to
leverage the novel balanced focal loss to dynamically mitigate
the discrepancy of the data distributions between training and
inference. We then presented the experiments with MGD-gram
and selected complementary features on the ASVspoof2019
dataset. Experimental results and detailed analysis verified the
effectiveness of the proposed methods by comparing them with
the top-performing systems from the 2019 Challenge.
Moreover, we analyzed the unexpected performance of deep
learning-based methods under real data. We hence argue that
besides additive noise there may be other mismatch between
real data (ASVspoof2019 Real-PA set) and simulated data
(used in the 2019 Challenge), or that time-level GMM back-
ends are more robust to time-frequency distortions than neural
networks. In the future, we will dive more into bridge the huge
gap for deep learning frameworks in real scenarios. We believe
that integrating information produced by conventional models
will be beneficial, which needs further explorations.
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